EMC – Request to Take Steps to Create an Independent Board (2001 – 2002)

Outcome: 56%

As institutional investors in EMC, we believe it is imperative that our company is governed well. We believe that good corporate governance practices are in the best interests of EMC in this intensely competitive market and will protect the interests of its shareowners.
Indeed, EMC has a positive record on a number of corporate governance issues. However the EMC Board is composed primarily of inside Directors (5 out of 8 Directors listed in the 2000 proxy were employees) and 2 others have close business relationships with EMC. In short, management dominates the Board. Especially in periods of economic difficulty, the widest possible breadth of perspectives on the company’s strategy and operations is imperative. The Board must be a thoughtful, independent voice and not a rubber stamp for management recommendations.
One of the problems of an “insider Board” is that key Board functions and committees such as nominating new Board members, and the Audit and Compensation Committees are heavily influenced by management. It is a conflict of interest for managers to decide their own compensation packages, audit the company’s financial records or develop the slate of Directors.
America’s corporate leaders seem to recognize the value of Board independence. As far back as 1992, a survey of 600 directors of Fortune 1000 companies endorsed by the Business Roundtable found that 93% believed that a majority of the Board should be composed of outside, independent Directors and a majority felt the Nominating Committee should consist entirely of outside Directors. As shareowners we agree. We need Directors who are not current or former executives of EMC or representatives of major suppliers or customers.
Many U.S. corporations have adopted Codes or Governance Principles that include a commitment to a Board with a majority of outside, truly independent Directors. In addition, many institutional investors, including some of the largest pension funds in the United States, actively support independent Boards. The Council of Institutional Investors, a prestigious association of pension funds with portfolios valued over $1 trillion, has supported Board independence in its governance guidelines. In fact, scores of shareholder resolutions asking for policies of Board independence have received majority shareholder votes.
We are well aware that the shareholders elect the Board, but they do so in response to the slate submitted by the Board. Thus we request that the Board take steps to ensure an independent Board by providing shareowners with new independent candidates for whom to vote.
We believe good corporate governance requires that such changes in EMC policy and practice be phased in as soon as possible Thus, we urge our fellow shareholders to vote for the following resolution:
Resolved: The shareholders request the Board of EMC take the steps necessary to nominate candidates for Director so that, if elected by the shareholders, there would be a majority of independent Directors. When sufficient independent Directors are elected we request that Audit, Compensation and Nominating Committees be composed entirely of independent Directors.